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Р. Торрент, О. Богурина-Ковалькова, А. Куэвас
ВОЗВРАЩЕНИЕ К ОСНОВАМ ГЛОБАЛЬНОЙ ТОРГОВОЙ СИСТЕМЫ: 
ВЗГЛЯД С ПОЗИЦИИ XXI ВЕКА
В настоящее время человеческое общество находится на непростом этапе развития, вклю-
чая торгово-экономические отношения между Западом и Россией. Каркас современного миро-
вого экономического порядка был сформирован после Великой депрессии 1930-х годов и Вто-
рой мировой войны. Осмысление его основ актуально с научной и практической точки зрения 
для оценки узловых проблем современной глобальной экономики и направлений ее развития 
в XXI в.
При решении поставленных вопросов авторы предлагают перейти от стратегии «Больше» 
(в частности, «больше либерализации») к стратегии «Лучше», включающей в себя такие ком-
поненты, как консолидация, завершение и слаженность. Эта идея была выдвинута одним из 
авторов настоящей статьи еще в 2001 г., до начала Дохийского раунда переговоров Всемирной 
торговой организации. Фактический провал этих переговоров, не в последнюю очередь неспо-
собность признать, что в установленном формате их, возможно, вообще не надо было начи-
нать, придают дополнительную актуальность дискуссии о смене стратегии. Библиогр. 32 назв.
Ключевые слова: международная валютная система, инвестиционный климат, преференци-
альные торговые соглашения, национальная безопасность, торговая либерализация, экономи-
ческие/торговые санкции, реформа мирового экономического порядка, Всемирная торговая 
организация (ВТО).
A. Introduction
Trade relations between the West and Russia in the last period are becoming 
increasingly confl ictive. In fact, we are living in rather troubled times globally, not only 
in the specifi c framework of trade relations between the West and Russia. And the chain 
of sanctions (and retaliations) that has developed and continues to develop has motivated 
an increasing interest on the discussion of the compatibility of such sanctions with GATT 
Art. XXI [Bhala, 1998; Goodman, 2001; Lindsey, 2003; Alford, 2011; Picket and Lux, 2015] 
to name some examples But the main thrust of this paper is not so much the analysis of 
this growing body of literature but that of stimulating refl ection on whether they are or 
not in conformity with GATT’s overarching objective.
Th e main reason for this lies in the fact that the current world economic order was 
also set up in a very troubled period: in the immediate aft ermath of WWII and the Great 
Depression of the 1930s. Th erefore, a refl ection on its foundations, based on very general 
considerations, as simple as very oft en forgotten or misunderstood, can be a refl ection 
into the present that could provide ideas for the future.
Th e refl ection also leads to a discussion of whether the strategy of “more”, in particular 
“more liberalization”, should be replaced by the strategy of the “better” and the strategy of 
the 3 Cs: Consolidation, Completion and Coherence, a thesis already put forward by one 
of the authors in 2001 before the launching of the WTO Doha Round of negotiations. Th e 
failure of the Doha Round, and more in particular the inability to accept that its launch 
was perhaps not a timely step, seems to strengthen the validity of this thesis. 
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B. Historical background
From a legal-political-institutional perspective, the current international economic 
order remains in its essential aspects as the one created in the aft ermath of WWII1 
[Herdegen, 2013], which aimed at responding to the specifi c problems of that historical 
moment2. Its main objective was to avoid the reappearance of the situation between the 
WWI and WWII [Jackson, 1997] characterized by the confl ict between the “capitalist 
blocs3”, orchestrated in particular through a spiral of growing protectionism leading to 
trade wars4 (consisting mainly of import restrictions and monetary measures infl uencing 
trade fl ows5). Th is undoubtedly led to the aggravation of the economic crisis and paved 
the way to WWII. 
a. WWI and the inter-war period
Th e period before WWI was characterized by growing worldwide economic prosperity 
fueled by moderate tariff s and expanding world trade underpinned by a relatively 
operative international monetary system based on the gold standard see [Eichengreen and 
Irwin, 2009]. Th is scenario was later heavily aff ected by the war, thus causing a very slow 
rebound of international trade and payments due to the slow-paced lift ing of wartime 
trade controls and tariff  levels, which became greater than they were during the pre-war 
period [Guzman and Pauwelyn, 2012]. 
Restoration of the world economy was severely hindered by the 1929  worldwide 
recession and the signature of the US Smoot-Hawley 1930 tariff  act [Jackson, 1997], which 
helped outbreak protectionist practices tending towards reducing world trade. However, 
it is noteworthy highlighting that even if such race towards protectionism has been 
repeatedly reported to be quite generalized, evidence suggests that the extent to which 
countries imposed higher trade barriers varied extensively, notably between countries 
who decided to stick to the gold standard (thus keeping a fi xed currency) and those who 
1 From a political perspective, this fact can be immediately grasped when observing the composition 
of the United Nations Security Council. Its permanent members are still the US, France, the UK, China 
and Russia (as the successor of the Soviet Union); from an institutional and economic standpoint, the main 
pillars of international economic relations remain the same as those created immediately aft er the war: the 
WB, the IMF — these two known as Bretton Woods Institutions- and the GATT (which turned into the 
WTO in 1995).
2 For a full historical overview, see [Diebold, 1962].
3 Th e “Capitalism of Blocs” refers to a situation in which “great powers” split the world into infl uence 
zones: on the one hand, the UK and France and their respective colonial empires; on the other hand the US; 
and fi nally the emerging zones of infl uence from both Japan and Germany. In the context of this division of 
the world, each “great power” tried to fi nd a unilateral solution to the Great Depression of the 30’s by export-
ing its products and trying to isolate itself from the rest of the world. Th e idea was to off set a weak domestic 
demand, the main feature of the Great Depression, through restrictions to imports and export support.
4 We mean by ‘trade war’ a situation in which countries engage in a competitive protectionist spiral 
to raise trade barriers in order to protect domestic producers and retaliate against each other’s barriers. Th e 
use of the term “war” may seem an exageration to some but, for us, is simply a healthy reminder that “trade 
wars” can become the best economic context for overall wars, as historical experience, mainly that of the 
inter-war period in the 1930’s, proves. Th e ‘trade war’ term will be constantly revisited in this paper. For 
further reference, see the WTO document “10 benefi ts of the World Trading System” (https://www.wto.org).
5 Such as blocking access to foreign currencies, imposing restrictions on international payments, or 
rather competitive devaluations leading to promoting (and reducing prices of) exports while increasing 
import prices andrestricting imports overall.
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departed from it (thus allowing their currencies to depreciate) see [Eichengreen and 
Irwin, 2009].
In any case, the so-called “beggar-thy-neighbor” policies spread in the 1930s leading 
to an extensive increase of trade barriers and a consequent breakdown of multilateral trade 
as countries were willing to insulate their economies from economic downturn [Guzman 
and Pauwelyn, 2012]. Despite offi  cial conferences and multilateral meetings, notably the 
World Economic Conference in 1933, the spread of inward-looking antitrade economic 
policies was far from stopping. In the political scenario, skepticism towards democratic 
governments to manage their economies and the shift  towards more authoritarian regimes 
in Germany and elsewhere exacerbated the tensions [Huntington, 1991].
b. WWII and the rethinking of the international economic order
Aft er WWII, international economic interdependence of states resumed, thanks in 
particular to the creation of the post-WWII Bretton Woods System [Jackson, Davey and 
Sykes, 2008]. Initial eff orts to establish a multilateral regulation of trade and fi nance were 
undertaken by the US to secure its intended economic worldwide expansion, an initiative 
that was supported by European States, who required foreign capital to restore their 
economies aft er widespread destruction during the war [Voitovich, 1995].
In the spirit of the founders of the international order conceived aft er WWII, 
three organizations were meant to gravitate around the UN General Assembly, the UN 
Economic and Social Council and their subsidiary institutions [Carreau and Juillard, 
2007]. Th e Bretton Woods conference gave birth in 1944  to two of such organizations: 
the IMF and the International Bank for the Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), 
the original WB institution6. Th e GATT, whose Secretariat became a de facto organization 
fulfi lling the duties of the envisaged ITO (the third Bretton Woods institution that only 
came into existence aft er the creation of the WTO in 1995), was the crucial engine for 
decades to avoid protectionist competition among market-oriented industrial countries 
and promote trade liberalization7. 
In order to avoid repeating the inter-war situation that led to the outbreak of the 
WWII, the establishment of an institutional system preventing, regulating or at least 
limiting the use of economic policy instruments was required. In order to reach this 
goal, this institutional system had to be built upon two basic principles: multilateralism8 
to prevent the reemergence of infl uence zones through trade preferences and related 
confl icts; and the consolidation of a certain degree of trade liberalization (not distorted by 
monetary measures and measures restricting international payments) to avoid increased 
protectionism or protectionist summun malum, a situation where domestic social or 
economic pressures lead some states to increase or reinstate barriers to trade, thus 
6 Th e usual term to refer to the IBRD is “World Bank”, even if, in purity, the IBRD is only one of the 
institutions (the main one) of the World Bank Group.
7 For further reading in depth on the rationale behind the creation of Bretton Woods Institutions, see 
[Van Meerhaeghe, 1966].
8 Rather than a unilateral liberalization as undertaken by Britain in the nineteenth century, the 
United States promoted a reciprocal trade liberalization scheme fostered by the Trade Agreements act of 
1934 whereby it lowered tariff s only when it received reciprocal access to foreign markets [Barton, Gold-
stein, Josling and Steinbert, 2006].
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triggering a competitive reaction in kind by other states, and eventually a “race to the 
bottom” that is disastrous for the global economy [Howse, 2007]. 
Other important areas of international economic relations such as international 
capital fl ows and foreign direct investment fl ows (and therefore liberalization of capital 
movements) were left  aside for the sake of ensuring trade liberalization and a relative 
monetary stability see [Herdegen, 2013]. Th is explains why, even now, seventy years aft er, 
there is a lack of legal of institutional framework for the expansion and internationalization 
of capital movements, in particular those that are not related to foreign direct investment. 
Th e creation of the IMF aimed at preventing the typical restrictive monetary practices 
of the inter-war period such as competitive devaluations and quantitative restrictions on 
international payments (applied unilaterally or bilaterally) through international liquidity 
creation (above all when turning the dollar into an international currency and allowing 
its injection in the world system through defi cits in the US balance of payments) and 
through limiting the recourse to devaluation of national currencies see [Hinojosa, 2010]. 
In sum, the IMF and its exchange rate system were designed to avoid the use of monetary 
weaponry for trade wars.
In the case of the GATT, its main objective was to regulate the use of trade measures 
in order to avoid trade wars as well. In order to reach this outcome it established in Arts. 
I and II two basic principles oriented to prevent them and accompanied them with a 
series of rules that create a code of conduct to be followed by its Member states when 
implementing their trade policies [Jackson, 1997]. Among the three typical rules that an 
international economic agreement may include (rules on uniform law or harmonization, 
market access rules and rules about treatment — MFN and NT), the GATT only uses the 
latter two, and the substantive rules are coupled with many exceptions. 
Th e principle of multilateralism, formulated under the MFN clause of GATT Art. I, 
defi nes “how” a State should approach its economic relations with other states: as said, 
its main purpose is that of avoiding the division of the world in competitive zones of 
infl uence of the main economic and political powers. Nonetheless, it does not defi ne 
either the “what” of these relations or “how much” these relations should be liberalized. 
Th is aspect is addressed by Art. II of the GATT as it consolidates a trade “liberalization 
fl oor” incorporated in a schedule of concessions. Th e best way of explaining the meaning 
of Art. II is through a pedagogic trick: imagine a spiral that opens from less to more 
liberalization and ask any audience which is the sense of the GATT. Th e unanimous answer 
will likely be the opening of such spiral. Such answer is incorrect because the ultimate 
sense of the GATT is to impede that beyond certain point the spiral gets closed. Th is is, in 
fact, the content and the result of its article II: the consolidation of a trade “liberalization 
fl oor” (incorporated in a schedule of concessions) that cannot be perforated. Contrariwise, 
the GATT does not have at its disposal any powerful legal mechanism that forces to open 
the spiral of trade liberalization. Th e only obligation imposed by GATT over its Members 
in this direction is simply to participate in the negotiations that could be initiated without 
prejudging their outcome. In other words: in a progressive liberalization perspective, what 
is powerful in GATT is its static aspect (the obligation of not going backwards imposed 
by Article II) and not its dynamic aspect (the eventual negotiations with a view to further 
liberalization). 
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C. Th e GATT exceptions: the case of national security exception in Art. XXI
Th e GATT contains a variety of exceptions or emergency provisions in view of cer-
tain circumstances in which a Member might need to depart from GATT obligations 
without triggering a general crisis of confi dence in the system, and consequently a rever-
sion to beggar-thy-neighbor protectionism [Howse, 2007]. In overall terms, as long as 
GATT’s main objective is secured, it is not much worried about minor violations. Even if 
the exceptions to the general regime established by the WTO are still numerous and sig-
nifi cant, they are intended to provide certain degree of fl exibility to the functioning of the 
multilateral trading system [Basaldúa, 2007]. Th ese exceptions can be classifi ed as follows: 
a. Some relate to the “architecture” of International Trade Relations:
— GATT Art. XXIV: Territorial application — Frontier Traffi  c — Customs Unions 
and Free-trade areas 
— GATT Art. XXXVI: Principles and Objectives (Including considerations in favor 
of developing and least-developed countries) 
b. Some tend to free from the restrictions imposed by the GATT itself, in more or less well 
defi ned cases, some domestic economic policies:
— GATT Art. XII: Restrictions to Safeguard the Balance of Payments
— GATT Art. XIX: Emergency Action on imports of Particular Products
c. Some open the way, in more or less well defi ned cases, to specifi c trade measures that 
would violate Arts. I or II 
— GATT Art. VI: Antidumping and countervailing duties
d. Some are purely “ad hoc” (and have been moved from the GATT to the WTO 
Agreement)
— Art. IX of the WTO Agreement on Decision-Making on waivers.
e. Some are strictly political and are founded in the consideration that other societal 
interests must prevail over those of trade policy (and international commitments in this area). 
— GATT Arts. XX and XXI on General Exceptions and Security Exceptions, re-
spectively.
In this section we will focus on GATT Art. XXI, which is the more exquisitely “politi-
cal” one. Th is is why it has been considered, more in political practice than in literature — 
and barely in the GATT/WTO jurisprudence — as able to be invoked freely and appar-
ently unquestionable. Nevertheless, there have been instances in which this exception has 
been invoked in the GATT history such as authorizing the application of economic sanc-
tions by some Members. As mentioned in the introduction, there is a vast body of litera-
ture discussing trade sanctions (import or export embargo) and their justifi cation under 
the National Security exception under GATT Art. XXI, and this provision gains special 
relevance given the recent sanctions and retaliatory actions between the West and Russia. 
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It is worth mentioning that the “national security” exception of GATT Art. XXI was 
initially conceived to be part of the general exceptions embedded in Art. XX, as refl ected 
by its initial draft ing stages [Bhala, 2005]. Th is is of special relevance as the subsequent 
moves to make it a standalone provision have deprived it from being subject to the condi-
tions of the chapeau of Art. XX under which the relevant exceptions raised by a Member 
are subject to an examination of whether they are “arbitrary or unjustifi able discrimina-
tion” between countries where the same conditions prevail and whether it constitutes a 
“disguised restriction on trade”9. Th is chapeau of Art. XX is aimed at protecting against 
abuse of the itemized exceptions. 
GATT Art. XXI is of considerable importance even if, as we have just outlined, it has 
been seldom formally and explicitly invoked. It has helped shield an arsenal of national 
security statutes from the United States pursuant to which it has taken unilateral action 
that would otherwise clash with GATT MFN treatment (Art. I), tariff  bindings (Art. II), 
national treatment (Art. III) and quantitative restrictions (Art. XI), which cannot be man-
aged by GATT Art. XXXV:1 (b) that handles economic measures, or Art. XXV dealing 
with waivers [Bhala, 2005]. 
GATT Art. XXI clearly states:
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed:
(a) to require any contracting party to furnish any information the disclosure of 
which it considers contrary to its essential security interests; or
(b) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action which it considers 
necessary for the protection of its essential security interests
(i) relating to fi ssionable materials or the materials from which they are derived;
(ii) relating to the traffi  c in arms, ammunition and implements of war and to 
such traffi  c in other goods and materials as is carried on directly or indirectly 
for the purpose of supplying a military establishment;
(iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations; or
(c) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action in pursuance of its ob-
ligations under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of international 
peace and security.
Th erefore, under GATT Art. XXI, a WTO Member can invoke the security exception 
either because it has unilaterally decided that its security is threatened, or in order to 
comply with its obligations with the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of 
international peace and security [Mavroidis, 2013].
From a close reading to this article several elements can be distilled [Bhala, 2005]:
— It constitutes an all-embracing exception as suggested by the word “nothing” at 
the beginning of GATT Art. XXI. Th erefore, upon invocation of such article, there 
is no GATT obligation free from a possible disrespect by a Member invoking it. 
Th is point is further reinforced by the 1949 Decision of the Contracting Parties10 
in a case brought under Art. XXIII of GATT by Czechoslovakia against the 
United States. Some key considerations of that case are outlined below.
9 See GATT Art. XX. 
10 Decision of 8 June 1949, II B. I. S. D. 28 (1952), GATT/CP. 3/SR. 22.
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— Discretionary character of Art. XXI (b): this provision contains the word “it”, 
which leaves to the sole discretion of the Member invoking the sanction the de-
termination of whether an action conforms to the requirements set forth in Art. 
XXI (b), including the defi nition of what constitutes “essential security interests”. 
Th is leaves out of play other Members or group of Members or WTO panel or 
other adjudicating body when determining for a sanctioning Member whether 
a measure satisfi es the requirements. Th is was present in the statement of Ghana 
concerning Ghana’s boycott of Portuguese goods when Portugal acceded GATT 
in 1961. 
4 principles may be deduced from Art. XXI (b):
1. A sanctioning Member need not give any prior notice to impending national se-
curity sanctions, nor need it give notice upon or aft er the imposition of sanctions. How-
ever, the Decision Concerning Art. XXI of the General Agreement by GATT Contracting 
Parties (L/5426, adopted on 2 December 1982, 29S/23) encourages Members to inform to 
the fullest extent possible of trade measures taken under Art. XXI as a procedural recom-
mendation (subject to the exception of Art. XXI: a). In the case of the sanctions imposed 
against Russia, leaving aside that the sanctioning countries could use Art. XXI (b) (iii), it 
is also arguable whether sanctions imposed under Art. XXI (c) as well can be undertaken 
without having any basis on UN Security Council Resolutions. Perhaps the shortcomings 
of GATT Art. XXI could be read as in the lines of the panel report in Nicaragua Trade 
(1986, L/6053 of 13 October 1986) whereby the terms of reference of such panel stated 
that the panel could not examine or judge the validity or motivation for the invocation of 
Article XXI by the United States. 
2. A sanctioning Member need not justify its determination to the WTO or its 
Members. As refl ected in the panel report in US-Export Restrictions (Czechoslovakia, 
1949), “every country must be the judge in the last resort on questions relating to its own 
security”. Even if the wording of the chapeau of Art. XXI (b) has been claimed to slightly 
restrain action (as it requires that the relevant Member makes sure that the measure is 
“necessary” for the “protection” of that Member’s “essential security interests”), the poten-
tial for abuse exists. 
3. A sanctioning Member need not obtain the prior approval or subsequent ratifi -
cation of the WTO or its Members.
4. A both actual and potential damage could be comprised.
Th ree possible scenarios are envisaged in the application of Art. XXI [Bossche and 
Zdouc, 2013]:
1. To restrict trade in order to protect strategic domestic production capabilities from 
import competition (political in nature).
2. To use trade sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy against other States, 
which allegedly violate international law or pursue policies considered as unacceptable or 
undesirable.
3. To prohibit the export of arms or other products of military use to countries with 
which they do not have friendly relations.
If we were to fi t the sanctions imposed to Russia, it seems like the second option is 
the one that has been applied by Western countries (among them, the United States, the 
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European Union, Australia, Norway and Canada) aft er control over Crimea shift ed from 
Ukraine to Russia. 
As we noted above, unlike GATT Art. XX, Art. XXI does not have any chapeau to 
avoid misuse or abuse of the exceptions contained therein [Bossche and Zdouc, 2013]. 
However, even in the Czechoslovakia case cited above, the Panel was clear when stating 
that “every Contracting Party should be cautious not to take any step which might have 
the eff ect of undermining the General Agreement” (Panel Report, US-Export Restrictions 
(Czechoslovakia) (1949), GATT/CP. 3/SR. 22, Corr.1) also see [Mavroidis, 2013]. More-
over, in the context of the confl ict between the UK and Argentina on the Falkland Islands/
Islas Malvinas, the GATT Contracting Parties adopted a Ministerial Declaration, which 
stated that “the contracting parties undertake, individually or jointly…to abstain from 
taking restrictive trade measures, for reasons of a non-economic character, not consistent 
with the General Agreement” (L/5424, adopted on 29 November 1982, 29S/9, 3). 
Fortunately, the exceptions under Art. XXI have been little used by GATT/WTO 
Member States. However, should the WTO continue in line of what the panel stated in 
the Nicaragua case, the WTO Dispute Settlement System will be deprived from evalu-
ating the rationale behind the imposition of the sanction in an apparently clear case of 
disguised protectionism. Th is threat of using GATT Art. XXI exceptions on unjustifi ed 
grounds, and the wide open door left  to Members with little scrutiny from WTO Dispute 
Settlement bodies, coupled with the non-existent jurisprudence, serves to get back to the 
trade-wars we mentioned in the historical context.
D. How to view GATT exceptions, 
in particular the national security exception in Art. XXI
Th e amount of literature on how to interpret the GATT’s exceptions, and in particular 
Art. XXI, is quite vast and cannot be suffi  ciently reviewed here given the limited scope 
of this paper. We want to keep to our main point: the risk of resorting systematically to 
exceptions, and in particular the ones politically minded such as that of Art. XXI, is that 
of undermining the “Grand Design” of the GATT, which aims at avoiding “Trade Wars”, so 
close to “overall Wars”. Th is is why we attempt to draw from diff erent sources of law some 
aspects that would help strengthen a sound interpretation of Art. XXI in order to avoid 
moving backwards in the liberalization process already achieved.
a. Fitting EU and US sanctions against Russia under Art. XXI
EU and US trade restrictive measures against Russia could be likely fi t under Article 
XXI (b) (iii) and in a less degree under the Article XXI c). As it was pointed out before, 
in general terms, Art. XXI provides fl exibility and a wide discretion to Members to 
apply trade-restrictive measures to protect their essential security interests. Th e lack of 
a chapeau similar to that of Art. XX, as outlined above, the lack of the obligation of prior 
notifi cation and the self-assessment of what are “essential security interests” seem to 
confi rm this statement. However, if we consider the negotiating history of the GATT and 
the international customary law in connection with the wording of GATT Art. XXI some 
doubts arise on the scope of interpretation of such article. 
Th e negotiating history of the GATT clearly shows that the draft ers of the original 
Draft  Chapter (EPCT/A/PV 33, p. 20–21 and Coorr. 3; EPCT/A/SR/33, p. 3) were aware of 
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the danger of having a too wide security exception. Several negotiators stressed the need 
to draft  provisions which “would take care of real security interests and, at the same time, 
limit the exception so as to prevent the adoption of protection for maintaining industries 
under every conceivable circumstance” (EPCT/A/PV/33, p. 20–21  and Corr.3; see also 
EPCT/A/SR/33, p. 3). Th ese statements show the willingness of the draft ers to seek a 
balance between a) the inherent sovereign right of Members to protect their real security 
concerns and b) preventing them to use this provision for pure commercial purposes in 
actions that would undermine the objectives of the General Agreement. 
In addition, the Panel found in relation to the US trade embargo against Nicaragua 
(1986, L/6053  of 13  October 1986, C/M/188, para. 5.2)  that “this provision should be 
interpreted in the light of the basic principles of international law and in harmony with the 
decisions of the United Nations and of the International Court of Justice”. Considering the 
wording of GATT Art. XXI, it is diffi  cult to believe that the word “necessary” (for the 
protection of its essential security interest) appeared by coincidence. 
In the concrete case of the EU and US economic sanctions against Russia in view of 
Art. XXI c) this article may hardly be invoked because it requires an explicit authorisation 
form United Nation Security Council. Th is argument was used by Yugoslavia when it 
claimed inconsistency of the EC trade-restrictive measures under, inter alia, Article XXI 
c) stating that “there is no decision or resolution of the relevant UN body to impose economic 
sanctions against Yugoslavia based on the reason embodied in the UN Charter…the “positive 
compensatory measures” applied by the EC to certain parts of Yugoslavia (are contrary) to 
the MFN treatment… (DS27/2, dated 10 February 1992). 
However, as pointed out by Diana Desierto [2014], “an argument could be made 
that the EU and US sanctions were taken as internationally permissible countermeasures 
against Russia’s continuing failure to observe UN Assembly Resolution 68/262” (Territorial 
Integrity of Ukraine, 27 March 2014).
b. “Necessity”, “essential” and “security”
Th ere are several instances under WTO covered agreements where a “necessity test” 
appears. However, due to the lack of precedent on the specifi c necessity test under Art. 
XXI, we fi nd it useful to look at the interpretation of “necessity” under International Law 
Commission (ILC) as it can shed light at least on the self-judgement exercise that under-
takes a Member when imposing trade restrictive measures under such article. 
Perhaps some wording that can be illustrative on necessity is Art. 25  of the Draft  
Articles of the ILC on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts and its 
comments, whereby necessity has been understood “to denote those exceptional cases 
where the only way a State can safeguard an essential interest threatened by a grave and 
imminent peril is, for the time being, not to perform some international obligation of 
lesser weight or urgency” and it is worth noting that it can include “a great danger either 
to the essential interests of the State or of the international community as a whole”11. 
Th erefore, a narrow reading of “necessity” avoiding the abuse of such provision seems to 
be appropriate.
11 See ILC Commentary to such article available at: http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/
commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf.
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As regards what constitutes an essential interest, following the ILC comments on Art. 
25, the “extent to which a given interest is essential depends on all the circumstances, and 
cannot be prejudged”. What can be drawn from such reading is also that there should be 
a confl ict between the international obligation and the threatened “essential interest” of 
the State/Member in question, and that the act being challenged must have been the “only 
means” of safeguarding that interest12. 
Regarding the notion of “security”, some examples can be drawn from Investment 
Law. For instance, the LG&E Tribunal (ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1) rejected the idea that 
the notion of the security exceptions of Article XI of the US-Argentina BIT may only be 
applicable in circumstances amounting to military action and war. Th e Tribunal stated 
that “when a state’s economic foundation is under siege, the severity of the problem can 
equal that of any military invasion”. If we were to draw such assumption from the inter-
pretation of Art. XXI, this could suggest a possible reading away from military action and 
can leave the door open to invoking such article in view of purely economic concerns (see 
the case of Sweden on import of footwear, who claimed a minimum domestic production 
capacity in vital industries in order to secure provision of essential products necessary 
to meet basic needs in case of war or other emergency in international relations, a case 
quoted in Bhala, 2005, p. 560).
Another consideration that is worth-mentioning is the spillover eff ects of trade sanc-
tions. In light of the global value chain (GVC) organization of the international economic 
relations based on the diff erent stages of the production located across diff erent countries 
(http://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/global-value-chains.htm), the unilateral political decision 
of one country to impose economic sanctions or embargoes may have a negative impact 
in third countries that a priori have nothing to do with this decision. Th e lack of a standing 
on third parties to intervene in the imposition of a trade measure or sanction responding 
to a security concern is a gap or loophole of Art. XXI that was perhaps not envisaged dur-
ing its draft ing. In the context of the current global interdependence, it could be argued 
that those aff ected third party Members could be able to respond with counter-measures, 
thus leaving the Pandora box open for the generalization of trade wars (to be more precise, 
for the plurilateralization of bilateral trade wars). 
From an economic standpoint, the reality shows that the imposition of trade-
restrictive measures against Russia hit not only the whole economy and the consumers’ 
rights in Russia but it also aff ected certain sectorial producers from EU, Norway, US and 
Canada although in diff erent proportion [Szczepański, 2015]. Even more, the decrease in 
the consumption capacity in Russia may potentially aff ect other economic sectors in third 
countries. It is diffi  cult to prove in which degree the trade-restrictive measures contributed 
to the deepness of the economic crises in Russia as their economic impact is diffi  cult to be 
12 As quoted from the ILC Comments of Art. 25: “According to the Commission, the state of necessity 
can only be invoked under certain strictly defi ned conditions which must be cumulatively satisfi ed; and the 
State concerned is not the sole judge of whether those conditions have been met. … In the present case, the 
following basic conditions … are relevant: it must have been occasioned by an “essential interest” of the State 
which is the author of the act confl icting with one of its international obligations; that interest must have 
been threatened by a “grave and imminent peril”; the act being challenged must have been the “only means” 
of safeguarding that interest; that act must not have “seriously impair[ed] an essential interest” of the State 
towards which the obligation existed; and the State which is the author of that act must not have “contrib-
uted to the occurrence of the state of necessity”. Th ose conditions refl ect customary international law”. See 
Gabˇcíkovo-Nagymaros Project, pp. 40–41, paras. 51–52.
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quantifi ed [Szczepański, 2015; Dreyer and Popescu, 2014]. As to the judgement of whether 
the measures imposed are eff ective to reinstate the previous situation that motivated the 
imposition of sanctions, there is no such test on Art. XXI either. 
Despite the wide discretion of Members to defi ne the main elements of Art. XXI such 
as “essential security interest” and, a priori, the less restrictive wording of this Article in 
comparison with GATT Art. XX, we suggest a careful and narrow reading, in conjunction 
with the negotiating history and with customary law, and in light of the general objectives 
and principles of the GATT Agreement in order to avoid protectionism, as refl ected in the 
essence of the non-discrimination principles and as outlined in the Preamble of the WTO 
Agreement13.
Historical lessons should not be forgotten and the main challenges today call to a 
questioning on how to preserve the trading system preventing states to take trade-
restrictive measures that may undermine the whole rationale of the GATT by interpreting 
exceptions widely. Furthermore, it should be stressed that self-assessment or self-
judgement of measures shall not serve as an excuse to invoke this article for purposes 
diff erent from legitimate essential security concerns as it may trigger negative spill-over 
eff ects in the increasingly globalized GCV economic order at the same time as increasing 
the likelihood of the protectionism spiral to raise.
E. Conclusions: more or better (and in any case diff erent): which should be 
the orientation of international economic relations in the future?14
In 2001, one of the authors argued [Torrent, 2001] that the international legal 
framework required, since a very long time, a deep revision and reorientation. Such legal 
framework, even if it is still based on the post-war legal order, has lost some its essential 
pieces (the monetary system), has grown in a disordered and contradictory way and is 
even putting in danger the principle of multilateralism itself, which remains the only 
key to avoid the re-emergence of dangerous forms of “capitalism of blocs” and confl icts 
between great powers.
Th is unquestionable reality has been veiled by an exclusively ideological reason: the 
hegemony of a vision centered on the promotion of liberalization processes (even if it 
is at the expense of weakening the architecture of the international economic order). In 
fact, from 1985 to 2008, the sign that has marked the evolution of international economic 
relations, in particular trade relations, has been that of “more liberalization” (deepening, 
broadening, enlarging…) through all possible approaches  — unilateral, multilateral, 
regional or bilateral-, all of which tended to be analyzed under the viewpoint of fi rst, 
second, third or nth best for economic liberalization.
13 As pointed out by Peter van den Bossche [2013] the importance of eliminating discrimination to 
avoid possible economic and political confrontation was highlighted in the Preamble to the WTO Agree-
ment, where “elimination of the discriminatory treatment in international trade relations” is identifi ed as 
one of the two main means by which the objectives of the WTO may be attained”.
14 Th e central argument of this concluding section is extracted from a Policy Brief written in the frame-
work of the Observatory of Relations European Union-Latin America (OBREAL). Th e “Cs” approach high-
lighted in the end was already outlined in 2001 by the author in the framework of one of the sessions of 
the Regional Dialogue on Trade Policy organized by the Department of Trade and Integration of the IADB 
(http://www.iadb.org/int/DRP/esp/red1/comerciodoc2.htm).
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We could take as fundamental dates of the beginning of this evolution a) the 
negotiations and the approval of the Single Act in the European framework (1985–1986) 
and b) the launch in 1986  of the Uruguay Round of Negotiations under the GATT 
framework that ended in 1993–1994. Th e evolution was accelerated through historical 
processes of decisive importance, most of which culminated in 1992–1994: a) the policies 
of unilateral trade liberalization in many developing countries, especially in Latin America; 
b) the launch of processes of regional economic integration such as MERCOSUR or 
NAFTA, that were allowed by such policies; c) the race towards the conclusion of bilateral 
agreements by the European Community (accompanied by Member States in agreements 
that were of wider scope and exceeded the exclusive competence of the Community); d) 
the disintegration of the Soviet bloc and the integration of its former economies to the 
capitalist world; e) the deepening (above all, the Monetary Union) and the expansion of 
the European integration process to new Members. 
Th e Politics of “More” (more liberalization, more coverage) showed clear symptoms 
of exhaustion since the middle of the 90’s. Th e fi rst sign was the clamorous failure of the 
negotiations conducted under the OECD framework for the signature of a Multilateral 
Agreement (in fact, plurilateral) on Investment (MAI)  — years 1995–1998. Th e second 
one, the diffi  culties to make the multilateral liberalization process go forward in the WTO 
framework aft er the Singapore Ministerial Conference in 1996 (failure of Seattle, certainly 
amended in Doha but only in absolutely exceptional circumstances). Th e third one, the 
inability of reaching an agreement about the thematic content and the agenda of the Free 
Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) that, even if it was made public to the whole world 
aft er the failure (dressed up as success) of the Miami Ministerial Conference in November 
2003, was well noticeable since the beginning to any informed observer with a critical sense. 
Th e fourth one, the installation of MERCOSUR since 1995 in a “regulatory plateau” — of 
low height — upon completion of the fi rst stage of elimination of intra-block trade tariff s, 
which ratifi ed the apparently insuperable diffi  culties experimented by the processes of sub-
regional integration in Latin America in order to reach the objectives initially fi xed. 
Regarding the European Integration process, it seemed to many that its progress was 
unstoppable. However, the institutional and political deterioration of the process was 
clearly perceptible since a long time ago, as well as the incapacity for defi ning a coherent 
strategic project that replaced the initial project (the resolution of the French-German 
historical confl ict through economic cooperation, already successfully culminated). Th is 
deterioration and this incapacity were clearly transparent behind a series of strategies by 
default, the systematic use of the fuite en avant tactic and the enthronement of the pathetic 
“bicycle theory”, which will fall onto the ground if it does not advance, as a decisive argu-
ment, not only for the political discourse, but also for academic analysis. Today, nobody 
discusses anymore that the process is in a deep crisis situation.
Th e alleged failure of the Doha Round in the WTO framework only confi rms this 
exhaustion. As anticipated, the degree of success has been extremely limited, with the 
timid adoption of a Trade Facilitation Agreement in the context of the Bali Ministerial 
Conference15 (not yet entered into force) and a package in the Nairobi Ministerial Con-
15 Th e 9th WTO Ministerial Conference was held in Bali, Indonesia, on 3–7 December 2013. Th e Bali 
Package included measures intended to streamline trade, allow developing countries more options for pro-
viding food security, boost least-developed countries’ trade and help development more generally. More 
information available at: https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news13_e/mc9sum_07dec13_e.htm.
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ference16 whose success is yet to be seen.. Doha Round’s failure refl ects that the raison 
d’être of the multilateral trading system is not the uncontrolled advance of the liberal-
ization process, but rather the creation of a stable framework of rules that impede the 
backward step of the liberalization freely agreed thus avoiding trade wars that in a fateful 
past characterized the “capitalism of blocs”.
Th ere is only one process that, at least not long ago, seemed to enjoy perfect health: 
the negotiation of bilateral trade agreements. However, without discarding the risk that 
its proliferation could end up causing a complete fragmentation of the world trading 
(and economic) system, it is very possible to confi rm the thesis already pointed by many 
saying that the only possible bilateral agreements are those that are very asymmetric in the 
dimensions and power of their Parties, and where the bigger country or block imposes its 
conception (although we nowadays witness negotiations between powerful parties in the 
so-called Mega-Regionals including the TPP and the TTIP initiatives). With independence 
from the assessment made to these asymmetric agreements, many will maybe consider 
that a) their eff ects over the whole world system are very limited and b) their interest for 
big players is not that important either and maybe does not justify the internal diffi  culties 
they cause (in the United States, to take an obvious example). In this perspective, we could 
maybe predict that not even in the bilateral framework the Politics of “More” will continue 
advancing in a very meaningful way.
We should not be surprised by the exhaustion of the “more” approach. If we had refl ected 
on the enormous scope of the processes we indicated at the beginning and we add to them 
another one as decisive as the progressive integration of China to the world of international 
trade relations, we could have realized very easily that this acceleration of the openness and 
integration processes could not continue indefi nitely and had to stop one day.
Once the approach of the “more” is exhausted, which orientation should be followed? 
It is not hard to fi nd the answer: “the approach of the best”, that is, to improve the status 
of the international economic relations (and in particular trade relations) on the basis of a 
better use of what already exists. Th e discussion of this approach clearly exceeds the limits 
of this paper; however, some ideas can be put forward:
— In the fi rst place, it is about making an eff ort of consolidation: not superimposing 
new and hard reforms over reforms that are still on course and have not developed 
their whole potential.
— Secondly, it is necessary to give priority to the completion of pending work. In 
the case of the WTO, it had to be clear to everyone in the second half of the 
1990s that the priority had to be China’s accession to the Organization (in order 
to complete its “world dimension”) and not the launching of a new round of 
negotiations that could never be successful if it overlapped with the transition 
period established for China. Th e same type of argument applied and continues 
to apply (at least until the end of its transition period) in the case of Russia.
— In the third place, it is necessary to reinforce the coherence of the whole global 
system and the diff erent agreements that coexist within it in order to avoid 
16 Th e 10th WTO Ministerial Conference was recently held in Nairobi, Kenya, on 15–19 December 
2015. Th e so-called Nairobi Package comprised six Ministerial Decisions on agriculture, cotton and issues 
related to least-developed countries. For more information see: https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/
minist_e/mc10_e/mc10_e.htm.
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contradictions among them that reduce or even eliminate their respective 
benefi cial eff ects and end up making the system ungovernable. 
— In the fourth place, we should give more time to allow all this multiplicity of 
legal and political instruments to get better known. To know well (another C in 
Spanish: “Conocer”) is the prerequisite for taking better advantage of agreements 
system we have at our disposal. 
Th e focus on these four ideas or Cs could have been very useful. For example, the fi rst 
two ideas could have perhaps discouraged the launch of a new WTO Round of Negotiations 
before the expiration of the 10-year transition periods contained in the agreements that 
emerged in the Uruguay Round and before the digestion of a fact of such importance as 
China’s accession to the organization. Th ey would have also discouraged the superposition 
of more or less constitutional reforms in the framework of the European integration 
process before digesting the previous ones. In addition, the last two ideas would have 
avoided, for example, the absurd discussion about investment as a “new subject” within 
the WTO when the GATS is, above all, an agreement about foreign direct investment 
(re-baptized as “commercial presence” or “mode 3” of trade in services) and when the 
most interested in renegotiating another agreement about investment regime (the TRIMs 
Agreement) seem to be some developing countries. Th is is such an absurd discussion that 
has not allowed the discussion of the compelling task of designing an international legal 
framework on foreign investment that fi lls the gaps of the post-war order and puts an end 
to the proliferation of bilateral agreements.
And if, in spite of everything, we would like to continue promoting the politics of 
the “more”, it is indispensable to recognize with humility and realism that the advances 
will not take place if we keep on going through the same path we have been following 
during these last years, which has not taken us anywhere. Diff erent approaches should be 
designed and practiced. 
Th is thesis put forward in 2001, adapted in order to take into account two phenomena 
(the “Mega-regional” agreements — but let’s see what will at the end be the eff ective content 
of them… — and Eurasian Integration, which seems to advance quite well), appears to 
be valid now, in 2015. Th is thesis off ers, in our opinion, the grand picture against which, 
beyond exquisite discussions on its interpretation, the applicability of GATT Art. XXI and 
the risks of it should be evaluated, moreover taking into account the request by Russia to 
negotiate a Decision on its interpretation. Are we, with the current chain of sanctions, more 
or less justifi ed by Art. XXI, advancing towards the better? We have serious doubts about it.
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